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Abstract In this paper we analyze the concept of interactions between policy
instruments addressing environmental, energy and climate change issues. Although
discussion on such policies has been taking place for almost two decades, their
interactions are not so sufficiently explored. Initially, we refer to literature on var-
ious types of interactions and we classify them. Furthermore, we construct a quali-
tative method that can assist policymakers in selecting an optimal policy mix. This
method breaks down into numerous components, the areas where different policies
interact, and facilitates the unveiling of potential overlaps and complementarities.
These areas consist of categories as measure identification, objectives, scope, market
arrangements, market flexibility, financing, technological parameters, timing, com-
pliance parameters and institutional setup. In addition, it renders the possibility of
combining different options and design elements of policies. Furthermore, a list of
various criteria serves as an assessment tool for interactions, where a weighing factor
and uncertainty parameters have been added, in order to produce an aggregate
indicator of the ex-ante analysis of the policy mix selected. Through this method, we
present a complete framework of discernment of diverse forms of environmental
policy instruments.
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1 Introduction
Recent trends in climate change, energy efficiency, and renewable energy policies
tend to support market-oriented schemes due to their high efficiency and market
acceptance. Within the context of United Nations Framework Convention on
V. Oikonomou (&) Æ C. J. Jepma
SOM, University of Groningen,
PO Box 800, Groningen 9700 AV, the Netherlands
e-mail: v.oikonomou@rug.nl
123
Mitig Adapt Strat Glob Change (2008) 13:131–156
DOI 10.1007/s11027-007-9082-9
ORI GI N A L P A PE R
A framework on interactions of climate and energy
policy instruments
V. Oikonomou Æ C. J. Jepma
Received: 18 May 2006 / Accepted: 22 January 2007 / Published online: 15 February 2007
 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007
Climate Change (UNFCCC) Kyoto Protocol, several energy and climate policy
instruments, i.e., European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), UNFCCC
Kyoto Protocol project-based mechanisms, benchmarking, White Certificates
(WhC), Tradable Green Certificates (TGC), command-and-control mechanisms and
many others, evolve. As these instruments are designed and implemented in an
already policy crowded environment, interactions take place. These interactions can
take different forms and shapes and in general can be complementary, competitive
or self-exclusive. Various interactions of different policies, which target at different
areas of economic activities, are likely to result in complementarities and rein-
forcement among the policy mix. However, there is also a significant risk that dif-
ferent policy instruments might undermine each other’s objectives and credibility.
This raises the issue of compatibility of different regimes, which is crucial for policy
design. In this sense, policy interactions (PI henceforth) can affect the result of
overall targets of climate policy either positively or negatively.
In literature so far, few studies have dealt with the issue of climate PI. In most
studies, with a notable exception of the Interact project (see Sorrell 2003), the focus
lies mainly on comparison of couples of different policy instruments with some
attempts of analyzing potential interactions. Nevertheless, in most of these case
studies, the methodology is confined to a measure-to-measure analysis (predomi-
nantly emissions trading with taxes), but an extrapolation of such comparisons to a
general category of policy instruments is not present. Although individual measures
and policy instruments are analyzed at a great extent, the basic reasons why their
interactions gained little attendance still remain unclear, even if they are recognized
as a key issue for policy success. From a research point of view, one possible
explanation could be the lack of ex-post experience and thorough evaluations in the
long run of most of these policies. Furthermore, high degree of policy uncertainty
makes studies in this field rather difficult. Finally, especially in the case of interna-
tional policies, experience from negotiations (see UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol) has
revealed that they are a sensitive issue that reflects global or national political
preferences.
The basic objective of this study is twofold: on one hand is the understanding of
the essence of PI and the conceptualization of a framework for further analysis. On
the other hand, departing from the work of Sorrell (2003) and through combining
various literature sources, we adapt and evolve a method of assessing interaction of
current and future climate policies, with specific criteria and parameters. This
method can be used and further developed for forthcoming evaluation studies on
policy combinations, where an extended policy package can be analyzed, rather than
the measure-to-measure that is used so far. This method is purely qualitative and
provides a useful insight of several aspects of PI. The method is currently enhanced
with modeling exercises (see Energy and Climate Policy Interactions (ECPI) model
developed by the University of Groningen and National Technical University of
Athens), in order to better reflect reality and its application by policy-makers on
specific policies.
In Sect. 2 we present a categorization of existing measures according to economic
theory and literature. In the following Sect. 3, we present findings from different
studies on the background of PI through numerous examples of individual policy
instruments. Furthermore, we identify all possible areas of PI in a detailed form and
we extract initial bottlenecks and opportunities of combining policy instruments. In
Sect. 4, we conduct a thorough literature survey on criteria for policy evaluation and
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through a synthetic approach we construct an elaborated list of these parameters
that determine the qualitative or quantitative outcome of PI. We coalesce the ele-
ments from Sect. 3 and construct a conceptual model that serves as a tool for further
evaluation of PI. Finally, we conclude with some recommendations on bounding off
the constrictions stemming from different policy instrument interactions.
2 Climate change policy instruments
In this section we present different instruments for climate and energy policy. They
are categorized according to their degree of intervention in the market and to
whether they target producers (upstream) or users (downstream) of a polluting
activity. We acknowledge that such categorization differs within each literature
source and therefore we make use of general studies (OECD 1997; IPCC 2001 and
others).
Financial measures include subsidies, grants, and taxes. The government can
change the cost of energy through taxation and subsidy policies. The latter include
grants and low-interest loans while taxation policies address energy use or pollution.
The following types of taxation can be distinguished:
• Emission charges/taxes stand for direct payments based on measurements or
estimates of quantity and quality of pollutant discharged.
• User charges are payments for the cost of collective service functioning as a
financing device by local authorities e.g., for collection and/or treatment of solid
waste or sewage water.
• Product charges/taxes are applied to products that create pollution either when
they are manufactured, consumed or disposed of. Product charges/taxes are
intended to modify relative prices of products and/or finance collection and
treatment systems. One practical form of product charges/taxes is tax differen-
tiation leading to more favorable prices for ‘‘environmentally friendly’’ products
and vice versa (e.g., car sales differentials as on fuel efficiency, existence of
catalytic converter, compliance with emission standards and tax differentiation
between leaded and unleaded fuel) (OECD 1997).
Legal or regulatory instruments, where governments can set legal requirements on
power companies, industry and households with financial penalties for non-
compliance. They are traditional main pillars of environmental policy (command-
and-control). Examples include appliance, vehicle and building standards (on energy
use or emissions), land and other resource management codes and standards for
technology (e.g., a renewable portfolio standard in electricity requires that a
minimum percentage of electricity is produced by renewable technologies).
Organizational measures include negotiated and voluntary agreements. They are
commitments undertaken by power producers or industries in consultation or
negotiation with a public authority and are usually recognized by that agency; they
are expected to have a high degree of effectiveness if they are combined with other
policies. These agreements can take many forms concerning the degree of bind-
ingness (e.g., legally non-binding press statements to legally binding covenants).
They include a wide range of issues, such as a decrease in energy consumption or
phasing in of low sulphur petrol.
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Certificates or marketable (tradable) permits/quotas are, among others, emissions
trading schemes, White, Green and Combined Heat and Power (CHP) Certificates.
For emissions trading schemes, the basic principle is that any increase in emission
from a given source must be offset by a decrease in emissions of an equivalent
quantity. For example, when a statutory ceiling on pollution levels is fixed for a given
area, a polluting firm can set up a new facility or expand its activities only if it does
not increase the total pollution load. The firm must therefore buy ‘‘rights’’ or
allowances to pollute from other firms located in the same control area, which are
then required to abate their emissions by an amount equal to additional pollution
emitted by the new activity (OECD 1997).
2.1 Categorization of instruments based on their absolute targets
A basic distinction between measures is their ability to steer the absolute level of
energy use and emissions: RD&D (Research, Development and Demonstration) can
improve energy efficiency, but the concrete outcome in absolute terms is usually
hard to foresee since a substantial share of all RD&D efforts does not result in a
commercial product or service. Grants, loans and tax incentives may be more
effective than RD&D since governments can decide to offer them only for products
or services that are particularly energy efficient. Labelling concerns concrete prod-
ucts classified into different categories of energy efficiency and has a greater po-
tential to contribute to lower absolute energy use: if successful, it influences shares of
energy efficient purchases and hence contributes to a more efficient product stock.
Labeling operates via awareness and relies on well-informed buyers. Standards have
a prescriptive character and reduce energy use more directly. Examples of standards
on energy use are those implemented for buildings, but in this case total energy is
still likely to increase if the number of buildings increases. Negotiated/voluntary
agreements relate to one product and service unit and are independent of economic
development. There are also negotiated/voluntary agreements that refer to a larger
system (e.g., a sector) and concern its energy use in absolute terms or energy-related
emissions (defined likewise but less frequently the case). In this case, there is a clear
intention to steer the absolute input of energy or the absolute output of emissions.
The latter is also true for taxes. The rationale of indirect energy taxes is that the
stimulation of energy efficient behavior. If the tax rate is set at a new (higher) level
the only way to keep overall expenses the same is to reduce energy use. In contrast,
emission trading with fixed caps directly addresses the absolute quantity of emissions
but allows for flexibility in goal achievement by means of a certificate system. The
categorization of the above-mentioned policy instruments according to their basic
characteristics is presented in Fig. 1.
3 Defining interaction of policy instruments
In this section we make use of literature studies on combining policy instruments and
identify two core characteristics: the general theoretical background in the first part
and the specific areas and actors of PI in the second. We compound these elements
and construct an initial part of a theoretical model that canvasses the interaction of
climate policy instruments.
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3.1 Theoretical background of interaction
In order to thoroughly analyze the effects of a combination of different instruments
in climate policy, a proper definition of PI is required. Literature provides a broad
range of ideas on setting up a framework on the understanding of interactions.
Nevertheless, as mentioned before, most of these studies, with some illuminating
exceptions (see Sorrell 2003; Johnstone 2003 and others) refer to combinations or
comparisons of couples of different policy instruments, mainly emissions trading
schemes with taxes or other existing instruments in the policy mix.
3.1.1 Studies on general policy mix
One study on PI is the INTERACT project, which explores relationships
between the EU ETS and other climate policy instruments. A basic distinction
in this study is the internal and external interaction. The former refers to two or
more climate policy instruments while the latter to a climate and a non-climate
policy instrument (environmental or energy policy). A typical example is an
emission trading scheme and a carbon tax that affects the same participants,
while for the second case an emissions trading scheme that targets electricity
generators and an energy tax at the point of consumption, irrespective of the
carbon content of the energy used (Sorrell and Sijm 2003). Furthermore, an
important division in the same study at the level of governance is horizontal and
vertical interaction. Horizontal refers to the same level of governance (e.g., EU
ETS and EU labeling for energy efficiency appliances) while vertical to different
levels (e.g., Renewable Energy Certificate System (RECS) with TGC in one
member state). Other types of PI distinguished in this study are: Operational,
sequencing and trading. Operational entails the case where two policies coexist
when individual target groups may shift from one policy to the other or when
obligations set by one policy are modified as a result of another policy. An
example is with the EU ETS that allows opt-in and opt-out of targeted sectors
under some preconditions, when, in the same time a carbon tax takes place in a
member state (Sorrell 2003). Sequencing interaction stands for the case where
two policies addressing the same group follow each other in time. An example
Fig. 1 Policy instruments categorization. Source: adapted from Oikonomou and Patel (2004)
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is negotiating agreements with industry that are used as a baseline for the
calculation of the allocation of allowances under the EU ETS. Finally, trading
interaction signifies the influence of two policies through the exchange of one
environmental commodity between them, for instance when credits from Joint
Implementation (JI) or Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects are
exchangeable and tradable within the EU ETS. The same analysis of PI has
been conducted in similar studies originating from this project (see Sijm 2003;
Sijm and van Dril 2003; Sorrel and Sijm 2003; Sorrell 2003a, b). On the same
track, a study on interactions of WhC with EU ETS and TGC is presented by
Harrison et al. (2005).
Another study that dealt earlier with the issue of environmental policy combi-
nations is by Gunningham and Sinclair (1998). One category of PI there is inherently
complementary interactions, where two instruments coexist, irrespective of the cli-
mate or environmental target being addressed. An example is voluntarism with
command and control regulation (see Environmental Protection Agency 33/50
program in Guningham and Sinclair 1998). Participants in voluntary schemes may
have an incentive to go beyond the command and control baseline, but non-par-
ticipants still comply with the baseline. A second category is inherently counter-
productive instrument combinations, where one instrument diminishes the
effectiveness of another in the same policy platform (for instance, in terms of flex-
ibility for emissions abatement options, see technology regulations with economic
instruments). Another form is combination where the outcome is context specific,
where the effect depends on a particular context (e.g., voluntarism and self-regu-
lation).
Boots et al. (2001) in the Intracert project (http://www.renewable-energy-pol-
icy.info/intracert/interception.html) and Boots (2003) analyze interactions of
tradable instruments in renewable energy and climate change markets. The basic
categories are complete integration, complete separation, specified interaction, each
one combined with three different policy levels: national, ‘‘green bubble’’ and
international. Complete integration refers to the case where the commodity
(certificate) of a Renewable Energy (RE) policy incorporates the value of an-
other commodity, i.e., carbon value in an emissions trading scheme. Complete
separation implies that two instruments, even if they are parallel implemented, do
not interact at all. Finally, specified interaction pertains to PI under certain
conditions, for instance when participants in an emissions trading scheme can also
use RE in order to reduce their emissions by importing certificates from RE
projects.
In the same context with the previous study, Oikonomou (2004) in the EU SAVE
project ‘‘White and Green’’ (http://www.iiiee.lu.se/whiteandgreen), analyzes the
issue of compatibility between WhC, TGC and EU ETS. Three types of interactions
are considered: parallel functioning, one-way and double fungibility. Parallel func-
tioning refers to a clear distinction in target setting, which excludes the possibility of
integrating different schemes. One-way fungible instruments imply that the com-
modity (certificates) of a policy can be converted to another commodity of the other
scheme and be fully traded (see WhC with EU ETS in Bertoldi et al. 2005). Double
fungibility expands the interaction up to the possibility of full exchangeability
between the two commodities in both schemes. The same issue of one-way fungi-
bility is explored in detail by Calder and Hough (2001), which deal with potential
interaction between emissions trading related policies.
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3.1.2 General studies
Johnstone (2003) assesses the link between tradable permits and other environ-
mental policy instruments, mainly direct regulation, environmental taxes, subsidies
and voluntary agreements. PI is instrument specific and one policy can be used for
instance as a basis for implementing another (see direct regulation for allocation of
tradable permits). An evaluation of emissions trading with the Integrated Pollution
Prevention and Control (IPPC) Directive is presented by the European Commission
(EC 2002). A more general study by Pizer (1999) focuses on interactions between
price and quantity support schemes for climate policy, where cost uncertainty
determines the sort of interaction. In the same line, Smith (1999) examines the
compatibility of permits with other environmental policy instruments. Glanchant
(2001) argues in his study on EU environmental policy that PI are a natural outcome
within a policy mix but a certain degree of adaptability must be foreseen, where
specific requirements must be fulfilled: flexibility in an environmental policy mix,
integration with parallel measures in order to reduce policy uncertainty, horizontal
co-ordination between different policy branches and decentralization of policy.
Blyth and Lefevre (2004) assessed a different form of PI concerning different climate
policy instruments and the effect on energy security. Baron and Bygrave (2002)
explore the possibilities of linking national emissions trading schemes with
the UNFCCC Kyoto emissions trading scheme through specific parameters of
interaction.
There are also studies referring exclusively to interactions of different policies
with the EU ETS (Blyth and Bosi 2004; Boemare et al. 2003). Blyth and Bosi
identify the options of linking non-EU domestic emissions trading schemes with the
EU ETS and focus on implications of such linkages to design parameters of the
hybrid schemes. At the same time, Anger (2006) assesses the impacts of linking EU
ETS to emerging non-EU schemes under the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol. Within the
EU policy context, Boemare et al. (2003) research the potential interactions
between the EU ETS and the framework of negotiated agreements and emissions
trading that have developed in France and the United Kingdom (UK). Bohringer
et al. (2006) analyze efficiency losses from simultaneous application of an emissions
trading scheme and emission taxes.
Another part of literature focuses on the area of PI between TGC and emissions
trading schemes. Morthorst (2001) examines the case, where an international TGC
scheme can be combined with an emissions trading market under grandfathering and
auctioning allowances. Similarly, Jensen and Skytte (2003) focus more on the
interactions of these instruments and on the different goal setting, represented as RE
production and emissions reduction.
3.1.3 1st step: Initial type of interaction
We construct our method of PI analysis based on the literature above. The first step
defines clearly the type of PI, since different attributes are assigned for different
approaches and subsequently policy targets can be specified. For instance, as stated
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2001), there are differ-
ences between national and international co-ordination between policies (e.g.,
international laws, or conflicts with international environmental regulations and
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trade laws). Therefore, a kick-off step consists of a conceptual table that recognizes
various PI (Table 1).
The types of interactions may vary depending on the scope and categories of
instruments. When attempting for instance to identify the links between a carbon tax
and an emissions trading scheme, the issue of fungibility should be skipped, since
these instruments are not homogeneous (i.e., trading schemes) and refer to different
instrument categories. Identification of possible overlaps provides us with an over-
view of compatibility of policy instruments selected. Such overlaps reduce the
achievement of specific targets and jeopardize an integrated scheme. The first
methodological step can be expanded to interactions of more than two policy
instruments, which can generate more options and types of interactions. Neverthe-
less, in this paper we limit ourselves to two instruments in order to avoid an increase
of the degree of complexity.
3.2 Areas of policy interaction
In this section we cite the literature findings on the areas of PI, which are used in our
method. As already mentioned, with some few exceptions (Sorrell 2003a, b), most
studies have developed a method for studying measure-to-measure combinations,
rather than PI as such. In the second step of our method, we break down the design
of instruments in detail and extract conclusions for synergies or conflicts within an
integrated scheme.
3.2.1 Literature on areas of policy interaction
Sorrell (2003) mention that PI can take place in the whole chain of policy design and
cycle: in the instrument that addresses a specific problem, the implementation
network (mix of public and private bodies that implement the policy), the target
groups (economic actors that are influenced directly or indirectly by the policy), the
outcomes and objectives that reflect the intended or unintended effects of policy,
and finally the context (stands for the broader economic, political and cultural
context in which the policy operates). These design elements are linked by rules and
influencing mechanisms. Rules are obligatory guidelines that lead the behavior of
directly influenced stakeholders, while influencing mechanisms are means of
enforcement of the policy and they provide incentives in order to guide participants’
Table 1 Example of defining primarily the type of interaction
Types of interaction Policy A Policy B Policy A/B
National (horizontal)
International (vertical)
Same policy context (internal)
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behavior. The method followed in the subsequent papers of the Interact project (see
for instance Sorrell 2003a, b; Sijm and van Dril 2003; Sorrell and Sijm 2003 etc.)
defines areas of interaction in some specific categories. Primarily, the scope of PI
refers to sectors, sites, and individual emissions sources (target groups) that are
directly or indirectly affected by the policy. Furthermore, the objectives of the
instruments are depicted in specific energy, emissions, or other environmental tar-
gets and can conflict, overlap, complement or be neutral towards each other. Jensen
and Skytte (2003) provide an illustrative example that refers to energy goals of a PI
in a certificate and power market. A third area of PI is the operational part of the
instruments, which refers to aggregate impacts of the instruments to target groups.
These impacts can be content specific and depend on the types of measures. Sijm and
van Dril (2003) focus for instance on the impacts of the EU ETS with a bench-
marking covenant and identify them on electricity prices, on heat and power gen-
eration, and on the use of benchmarking as a basis for allowances allocation of the
EU ETS. In general, the operation of two instruments can be counterproductive
(e.g., when instruments with high prescription undermine others with lower pre-
scription, i.e., taxes), neutral, duplicative (e.g., mandatory standard of an energy
efficient technology with subsidy to retrofit that technology), and complementary.
The next phase of PI consists of mechanisms of implementation of designed policies.
In this step, administrative obligations imposed on the target group, including the
functioning, monitoring, and reporting, as well as the obligations on implementing
parties (i.e., verification, accreditation, technical issues, enforcement of non-com-
pliance etc) are identified. Finally, timing of PI is examined. This refers to the
introduction of each instrument in the policy mix, potential changes that might take
place in the lifecycle of each instrument and the flexibility of instruments in terms of
reaction from target groups.
Another category of studies that explore areas of PI with a focus more on the
implementation issue can be found in Oikonomou (2004) and Bertoldi et al. (2005).
Both authors refer to the case of certificate mechanisms as interacting instruments.
The market is framed on the level of obligation, the size of target expected from both
policies, and the reference point to be measured. Departing from the common areas
with the previous study, as sector coverage, impact period and obliged actors, they
rivet on the market creation from a combined scheme. More specifically, market
participants are identified as entities that receive the obligation and other entities
that can act independently providing necessary liquidity to the market, alongside
with the definition of different commodities that are traded. Further, they attempt to
assign attributes of commodities traded. The implementing issue arising here is
whether different commodities should integrate and be bilaterally or multilaterally
traded, determined as one-way or two-way fungibility since according to economic
theory, more flexibility guarantees lower abatement costs or obstacles can show up.
In the same context, more detailed trading rules are explored, like the value of each
certificate/commodity and the possibility for banking or borrowing within the policy
timetable. Another area of interaction is the institutional infrastructure and the role
of responsible bodies, mainly in the field of implementing organizations, monitoring,
and verification.
Other studies pore to the PI between different emissions trading schemes (Haites
and Mullins 2001; Blyth and Bosi 2004; Boemare and Quirion 2002; Boemare et al.
2003; Calder and Hough 2001 and Baron and Bygrave 2002). As far as the scope
and targets set are concerned, areas of interaction identified are, among others, a
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voluntary or mandatory participation, opt-in/opt-out and phase in/out provisions, and
absolute or relative targets. Furthermore, on the operational side, these studies focus
on the nature of the commodity (allowance or credit), the denomination factor that
allows fungibility between different commodities. On the implementation issue,
basic areas of PI are compliance regime that includes penalties and sanctions for
effective enforcement, market flexibility with borrowing and banking, and ways of
trading allowances. Finally, in the institutional setup, the governance of an integrated
scheme refers to different bodies and background legislations, to ex-post or ex-ante
monitoring and verification procedures and registry provisions.
3.2.2 2nd step: Towards an integrated method
Departing from the studies mentioned in the beginning of this section, we combine
elements of PI and formulate the second step of our method. In Table 2, we present
an analytical table that includes all possible areas of PI alongside with an example of
the EU ETS and how it can interact with the Italian WhC scheme. The interaction of
the EU ETS with the UK WhC scheme, named Energy Efficiency Commitment has
been thoroughly explored by Sorrell (2003a, b). The purpose of this example is
purely to demonstrate the utility of this table, which can be further used for different
types of instruments. We acknowledge that a policymaker’s ‘‘optimal policy mix’’
problem consists of more complex options from the inventory of policy instruments
(i.e., combination of more than two instruments), but for the sake of simplicity we
focus on a double interaction.
In this method we divide the areas of PI in 10 basic categories, each one consisting
of specific elements. The categories are: Measure identification, Objectives, Scope,
Market arrangements, Market flexibility, Financing, Technological parameters,
Timing, Compliance parameters and Institutional setup. Our task is to identify the
compatibility issue between the categories. An analysis of these parameters can be
found in Oikonomou and Jepma (2006). The first step in Table 2 is to break down
different policy instruments into these parameters and assess them in a comparable
way. Furthermore, under the assumption that these instruments can interact or
integrate, we identify which specific elements can be complementary, overlapping or
neutral and then we sketch different options for a common policy. There are many
cases where there is a significant uncertainty about the accuracy of these parameters
and therefore the basic advantage of this method is that it allows a plethora of
options for designing policies. It should be noted in advance that the intention of the
authors is not to deliver solutions on the integration but merely to demonstrate how
different options can be considered when attempting to analyze the interaction of
different schemes.
4 Assessing policy interaction
In this section we present the third part of our method, focusing on criteria that can
be used in order to conduct a policy evaluation. We compile all criteria from liter-
ature and formulate them in a structured way in order to draw conclusions. Fur-
thermore, in the second part of this section we provide some explanations on the
assessment procedure.
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4.1 Criteria for evaluation
In this section we evaluate the effect that PI has in a broad range of society and
economic sectors upon criteria. A policymaker can compare these impacts with the
initial policy goals and objectives and weigh them in a general assessment of costs
and benefits.
Most studies combine the concept of criteria with areas of PI. In some cases, areas
of PI are used as an assessment method, which can complicate the evaluation. We
clarify and clearly distinguish among those two. We sort out six general categories of
criteria: effectiveness, efficiency, impacts on energy and market prices, impacts on
society, innovation, and market competition. A detailed explanation of these cate-
gories follows.
4.1.1 Effectiveness
As stated by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD 1997), environmental effectiveness depends on the polluters’ responses to
market signals and is a key issue in evaluating climate policies. A definition of
environmental effectiveness by Sorrell (2003) is the likelihood of the policy
achieving a specific environmental objective. Andrews (1995) demonstrates that
effectiveness is a concept comprised of the assurance of meeting the goals (stake-
holders’ confidence), pollution prevention, and environmental equity and justice
(equality of outcomes and full participation by affected parties in policy decision and
implementation). Within the context of PI, this notion expands also to the concept of
a potential added value of PI, in comparison to the baseline of stand-alone policy
instruments. We take into account the impacts on static and dynamic effectiveness,
which implies the fulfillment of PI emission targets with a time scope and also when
extending targets through time. We distinguish energy effectiveness, which is sub-
stantially different from the environmental and often confounded. Energy effec-
tiveness refers solely to specific energy targets, for instance security of supply or
promotion of RE and is not complementary (if not conflicting) to other targets.
Another criterion in this category is environmental integrity, which reflects the
impact of PI in the least cost emissions reduction (Haites and Mullins 2001). In
addition, security of energy supply is an important parameter in a PI, since most
climate policies focus on energy demand or supply sector. Blyth and Lefevre (2004)
investigated the impacts of interactions between energy security and climate policies
quantitatively on a global scale.
Another couple of parameters for assessing PI refers to the link between targets
and types of instruments, through their degree of coercion or prescription
(Gunningham and Sinclair 1998; Varone and Aebischer 2001). Coercion refers to the
extent, to which external parties or instruments place negative pressure on a firm to
improve its performance, while prescription is the extent, to which policy determine
the level, type, and method of environmental performance. Although prescription
and coercion are descriptive features of a measure or combination of measures, we
use them as independent criteria since their degree can influence significantly the
cost-effectiveness in a PI.
Finally, we make use of three well-known criteria stemming from market
behavior: free-rider effect, Baumol effect, and rebound effect. Free riders are
agents that make use of the policy but would have implemented the policy action
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anyway (Train 1994). Blok et al. (2004) provide a methodological approach in
quantifying the free-rider effect. Baumol effect can also reduce the effectiveness
of a combined policy in the sense that agents participating in a policy (e.g.,
subsidy) can make partial use of this in order to stimulate other activities (e.g.,
increase in production), which neutralizes the overall effect of policies. This effect
was initially described by Baumol and Oates (1988). Finally, rebound effect
basically refers to energy efficiency policies and can be explained from the fol-
lowing causal chain: an increase in energy efficiency lowers the marginal costs of
using an energy service. Energy services could be defined as a demanded com-
modity, i.e., hot water, refrigeration, heat etc. In order to produce this commodity,
energy is needed, alongside with other production factors, such as capital, labor
and management. Therefore, a utility maximizing consumer increases use of the
energy service, which raises the energy demanded (Quirion 2004). An overview of
the rebound effect can be found in Binswanger (2001), Greening et al. (2000) and
Oikonomou (2004).
4.1.2 Efficiency
Efficiency assesses the extent, to which interacting instruments achieve a cost-min-
imizing pattern of pollution abatement and can be calculated through the relative
direct costs and benefits of these instruments (OECD 1997). Sorrell (2003) differ-
entiate between static and dynamic economic efficiency. Static refers to minimization
of direct costs of environmental objectives in the short term. In theory, it addresses
the overcoming of market failures that imperil the achievement of these objectives
(Sorrell and Sijm 2003). Nevertheless, as Russell and Powell (1999) demonstrate,
instruments that attain static efficiency can carry over high institutional demands.
Dynamic efficiency, on the other hand, implies the potential to promote techno-
logical innovation and a reduction in compliance costs in the long run, when new
objectives are set (Andrews 1995). Direct costs for obligated parties (i.e., companies)
are reflect abatement equipment and use of more costly production techniques
(OECD 1997). These direct costs relative to abatement efforts on a regulated market
constitute a dimension of efficiency that refers to partial market effects of envi-
ronmental policies. They can be compared to indirect costs related to economic
adjustment effects on other markets through price/cost effects. These effects com-
prise partially welfare effects of policy instruments, which are treated as a separate
criterion, under social effects.
Another category of costs is administration and compliance costs. Administra-
tion costs are undertaken from the policy designing authority in a PI, such as
information gathering (alias information costs), monitoring, verification, registra-
tion, and enforcement costs. Compliance costs are administrative and managerial
expenses (different from the direct, as explained above) undertaken by the obli-
gated party in order to comply with the policy. One specific subcategory of
compliance costs are transaction costs, which involve expenses required to be
undertaken from the target group in order to follow the whole policy chain (e.g.,
information, technologies, prices, expertise, auditing, reporting emissions, service
fees, certification etc). As a general rule, the more procedures involved in the
policy chain, the higher these costs. Furthermore, institutional compatibility is
linked to direct and indirect costs but is treated here separately due to its high
significance for policy makers.
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Two issues that often come across when evaluating PI are the double regulation
and double counting. Double regulation implies a situation, in which one target
group is affected directly by two different climate policy instruments that achieve
similar objectives. In this case, if targets are not crystal clear, for example they do not
address different market failures, obligated entities consider themselves as paying
twice for the same target (Sorrell 2003a, b). Double counting is considered one
eventual threat to PI and has been often raised as an issue in previous linking
between trading schemes (i.e., TGC with the EU ETS, or between the EU ETS and
JI/CDM, see EC 2003a; Jepma 2003; Dewees 2001, Lefevere 2003). Double counting
of credits or allowances for emissions reduction occurs when the targets for the same
amount of emissions from sectors or sites are assigned to different obligated parties
(Sorrell 2003a, b). Zapfel and Vainio (2002) provide an illustrative example, where
three different effects of double counting are distinguished: double coverage, double
crediting and double slippage. Double coverage takes place when two countries
implement an upstream and downstream scheme respectively (for instance, when
fossil fuel producers in the upstream scheme acquire and trade allowances according
to their fuel and consumers or energy users in the downstream scheme must justify
their emissions from usage with allowances). In this case, allowances are required
twice in order to address the same quantity of emissions. Double crediting occurs
when two allowances are generated from one single action of emissions abatement.
This case applies to the same upstream/downstream scheme, when for instance the
energy users reduce their requested amount of energy (exogenous change) therefore
reducing their demand for allowances with a consequence that fossil fuel producers
reduce also their production (as a result of smaller demand) and in this manner they
free up allowances. The same bottleneck comes along when a downstream emissions
trading scheme in a country interacts with a new domestic upstream emissions
trading scheme. Double slippage refers to the case when emissions are not covered
at all by any scheme. As an example, a country with a downstream scheme exports
electricity to a country with an upstream trading, which leads to an increase of
non-accountable emissions in the exporting country (since end users are obligated
parties) and also an increase in emissions in importing country (since fossil fuel
producers are only accountable). Nevertheless, this case is not suitable for the EU
since under the EU ETS harmonization has been achieved (Zapfel and Vainio 2002).
Finally, efficiency of the PI can be affected by exogenous changes, where the
determining criterion is flexibility and adaptability of the system.
4.1.3 Impacts on energy and market prices
In this category we present energy prices as an endogenous variable that can be
affected by the PI, opposite to what was presented above, where these exogenous
parameters can influence the policy outcome. Our focus lies mainly on the impact
on prices of Carbon Dioxide (CO2), which can be derived from the price of
emissions allowances in the emissions trading schemes. An important factor is the
influence on the price of electricity, gas, RE and heat in all stages of their pro-
duction and sale. Finally, depending on the market structure, an estimation of the
impacts of PI on final price of products is necessary in order to derive the loss or
gain of social welfare.
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Table 3 Criteria for assessing the impacts of PI
Criteria for assessing impacts
of policy interaction































Flexibility and adaptability in exogenous
changes (electricity, gas, heat
prices and supply shocks)





Price of heat etc
Price of products
Impacts on society
Equity and fairness for directly
affected parties
Equity and fairness for indirectly
affected parties (i.e., consumers)
Employment
Business opportunities and trade
Governmental revenues




Invention of efficient technologies
Innovation of efficient technologies
Diffusion of new efficient technologies
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4.1.4 Impacts on society
The social impacts of PI can be assessed through numerous ways. We identify
some a priori parameters that could be also considered as wider economic and
‘‘soft’’ effects (OECD 1997). Under the ‘‘polluter pays’’ principle, issues of
equity and fairness for the directly and indirectly affected parties rise, explaining
how different policies can affect either the choices or the competitive position of
some parties vis-a`-vis other similar parties (Andrews 1995). Another aspect of
equity provided in this study is that different policies involve tradeoffs between
equality of treatment of different participants and equality of outcome. This
implies distributional effects and burden sharing between target groups, when
the latter contribute evenly to the achievement of the objective and costs in-
curred on the one hand, and when the rest of economic sectors can free-ride or
benefit from the actions of directly affected target groups while they do not
contribute to this effort (or most probably the other way around) on the other.
One wider indirect target of the climate policy is employment. More specifically,
under a PI between instruments with different targets (e.g., TGC for RE
production and WhC for energy efficiency), the result eventually could be a
stimulation of the employment in both RE and energy efficiency manufacturing
sector. The latter depends on the sources’ ability to carry over their increased
costs to end-users, which in turn determines market demand for the final
product and hence demand for employment in these sources (Baron and By-
grave 2002). Directly linked to employment are business opportunities and trade.
An example of RE and market based approaches to Greenhouse Gas (GHG)
emissions reduction in terms of employment is presented by Sonneborn (2004).
With multiple climate instruments, eventually new markets can appear, such as
certificates markets, where new players can seek business opportunities,
increasing hence the social welfare. Furthermore, depending on the type of
instruments applied, PI can generate revenues for the government, which could
be redistributed in order to achieve equity among target groups. Finally, a
parameter that is frequently used in environmental policy analysis is the increase
of environmental awareness, which indirectly leads the behavior of participating
entities in a PI towards more climate friendly production and consumption
patterns.
Table 3 continued
Criteria for assessing impacts
of policy interaction
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4.1.5 Innovation
A basic target of PI is to address market barriers that prevent the purchase and use
of new efficient and ‘‘cleaner’’ technologies. One very important parameter for the
overall effect of PI is technology innovation. This criterion comprises a part of the
dynamic efficiency, as analyzed above, but we include it separately due to the sig-
nificant impact it has on its own. Departing from the concept of innovation cycle, we
identify impacts of a PI on these phases: RD&D invention, Innovation and Diffusion
of new efficient technologies. An additional parameter, depicted by Andrews (1995),
is the diffusion of existing efficient technologies. The impact of PI on innovation can
be determined from the typology of instruments involved, since for instance eco-
nomic instruments are more likely to stimulate innovation in comparison to regu-
lations that merely require a given level of compliance (OECD 1997).
4.1.6 Market competition
An assessment of the emerging markets as a result of PI consists of criteria that
address fairness and competitiveness. A constraint for PI is that instruments in the
policy mix should enhance the energy market liberalization (see for instance EC
Directives 1996, 1998, 2003b). With the progressive advent of liberalization of energy
market and privatisation of state companies, emphasis has shifted toward market
regulations that introduce economic corrections addressing collective interests (such
as externalities) and long-term objectives, which generally are not taken into due
account by market forces in the absence of corrective measures (Oikonomou 2004).
Subsequently, an efficient PI must guarantee market transparency, where market
players share the same opportunities in trading and receive correct market signals.
Market efficiency can be jeopardized from monopolistic or oligopolistic threats,
which can lead to an advantageous position of some entities, which can manipulate
prices and reduce competitiveness. Also from the part of policy designing authority
that prioritizes targets, it should be vouched that no differential treatment takes
place among participants in a PI (Sorrell and Sijm 2003). In the same context, since,
at least in theory, the increase of participants provides more abatement options and
can thus reduce the compliance and marginal abatement costs to all sources, abol-
ishment of barriers for new entrants is important. Nevertheless, as is stated by OECD
(1997), while the extent of new entry can be observed, at a small degree calculation
of new entry would have taken place had the climate policies not been implemented
can be rather difficult.
Furthermore, as Harrison and Radov (2002) state, an important parameter is the
effect of PI on product market and eventual distortions it might provoke. This relates
to existing or policy induced inefficiencies in product markets. These distortions can
affect the extent to which compliance costs can be minimized. Finally, in the same
study another evaluation criterion is tax distortions in the market as a result of PI.
4.1.7 Uncertainty
An important parameter for PI that affects most of the above-mentioned criteria
lies in uncertainty in the policy choices. A key question is the political acceptability
and risk of implementing different policies, defined as the acceptability of key groups
in the economic system (Sorrell 2003). Guningham and Sinclair (1998) demonstrate
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that the implementation of instruments with high intervention and ambition levels
encounters political rejection. Varone and Aebischer (2001) and Johnstone (2003)
present similar results using case studies of different categories of instruments.
Furthermore, other uncertainties that might come up are compliance costs and
perceived fairness from obligated parties. Finally, Russell and Powell (1999) present
a division of a priori risks for the agency and for the regulated parties. As far as the
designing authority is concerned, a risk of failure to achieve goals can prevail,
alongside with lock-in existing technologies for too long (and lock out viable
alternatives) and other possible perverse responses. For regulated parties, the risk of
shifting these policies in time can lead to inefficient investments, since their payback
period is pre-calculated according to the initial time frame of the PI. Therefore,
these parameters constitute an obstacle in the evaluation of PI and as a result are not
mentioned as criteria.
As it can be clearly shown, many of the criteria that we analyzed above are
mingled with interlinkages and their inclusion as specific parameters can be debated.
Nevertheless, for the purpose of this paper and for the clarity of the method, we
include them separately since we attempt to extract their individual significance in a
PI.
4.1.8 3d Step: Evaluation criteria and assessment
In Table 3 we have conducted a synthesis of the criteria for ex-ante assessment of
the climate policy mix. Basic categories of criteria are effectiveness of the inte-
grated scheme, efficiency, impacts on energy and market prices, impacts on society,
impacts on innovation and finally impacts on market competition. In each of these
categories follows a list of specific criteria that can be assessed as positive, neutral
or negative for the functioning of the policy. Assessment is conducted on the
grounds of a baseline, where policies are stand-alone and do not interact. This
baseline differs between measures and is determined by the time setting, other
policies that affect individual measures exogenously, and the general economic
environment. OECD (1997) provides a list of different methods for the con-
struction of a baseline for environmental policy, which could also be used in this
case:
• Trend extrapolation: simple approach assuming that trends existing before the
new policies would continue unchanged if both policies (or at least the one) had
not been implemented.
• Econometric methods: use of econometric models that link emissions with some
economic variables and include a dummy variable that implies the time when the
new policy is implemented.
• Linear programming techniques: indicate how the decisions of firms change in
response to different constraints, so they refer mainly to optimization models.
• Judgement methods: Describe the baseline in complete absence of policy.
Nevertheless, in this case, the outcome is biased on the judgements made.
By constructing the baseline, we identify the deadweight loss of PI (autonomous
behavior of agents) and either subtract it from the total effect or set higher standards
for policy targets.
Furthermore, we have introduced a weighing factor, which refers to the gravity of
each criterion as reported by the basic focus and tradeoffs of the policy goals. This
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factor reflects eventually the opportunity costs that policy makers are willing to
undertake when designing policies. In our method, we allow the tradeoff (weighing
factor) for each parameter rather than their aggregated categories, aiming thus
at increasing flexibility of the policy makers. Such an example is a PI, where a
regulatory authority aims at maximizing security of supply (category effectiveness)
sacrificing employment opportunities (category impacts on society), while remaining
indifferent on the effect of PI on innovation (category innovation). Evaluation cri-
teria are attributed positive or negative values (–2 to 2). A negative value on a
negative criterion means that it affects significantly the outcome of PI. A negative
value on a positive criterion means that PI is affected negatively. The final calcu-
lations on the main categories of criteria (e.g., effectiveness, efficiency) are an
average from all the values (positive or negative) of the sub-criteria. The weighing
factor therefore does not represent solely the extent of targets tradeoffs. It rather
takes on the overall effect of PI, whether it enhances or jeopardizes the general
targets.
In the next column, we take into account the degree of uncertainty as an
important key factor for PI evaluation. As mentioned above, uncertainty in an ex-
ante study can lead to serious fallacies and because of this, we provide some
values of these risks in each criterion. The policy analyst can assign different
degrees of uncertainty (varying from 0 up to 1) in each specific criterion based on
his information gap and the non-stochastic relationships of different policy
parameters.
Finally, in the last columns we combine the effects with the significance and the
degree of uncertainty of each criterion and we come up with the total effect. The-
oretically, we determine this effect through multiplying individual effect with the
weighing factor of each criterion and the degrees of uncertainty. This calculation is




Ai Wi  Ui, where TE is the total effect of i criteria, A is the
positive, negative or neutral assessment, W is the weighing factor with values 0 to
1 and U is the degree of uncertainty with values 0 to 1. The policy mix with the
highest overall score could be considered as optimal, in relevance to the criteria
chosen.
4.2 Discussion on the overall assessment of policy interaction
Through the use of the previous methodological tables, we can weigh the significance
and tradeoffs of different PI implications and we can proceed to the overall
assessment of combined policy instruments. Nevertheless, there are some issues that
need to be further explained and discussed.
4.2.1 Ex-post or ex-ante analysis
A basic assumption so far is that when applying this methodological tool, we
possess full information on the parameters of individual policies. Some problems
that might arise from this assumption are the non-predicted instrument impacts,
unforeseen developments in the implementation of these policies, further adapted
design of instruments, and finally additional policies that might take place parallel
to the observed policies. In this context, as recognized by OECD (1997), a clear
line has to be drawn between ex-ante and ex-post analysis. Ex-ante evaluation is
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more restricted than ex-post evaluation in the sense that it forecasts impacts of a
PI against a hypothetical future scenario and evaluates these effects according to
fixed criteria. In contrast, an ex-post evaluation employs observations from the
past but still requires the construction of a hypothetical scenario without PI. We
conduct an ex-ante analysis, because very few climate policies have been imple-
mented so far and the existing ones are still in an infant stage of providing us with
significant results. In general, past experiences from specific (or similar) policies
(e.g., some forms of energy taxation or past market trading schemes) can be used
in order to project their future effect. Concerning the evaluation step, we
acknowledge that absence of actual data can restrict the outcome, while an ex-
post method could reflect at a higher extent reality. Due to this, we have added
the degree of uncertainty, as analyzed above, which reduces the risk of false
prognoses and dynamic changes of external factors in the course of evaluation
process. Such uncertainties, as stated by Pizer (1999) are the energy prices, the
future compliance costs, the evolution of new technologies, and determining how
uncontrolled emissions levels will change in the future. An alternative way of
evaluating interactions could be the mirroring of this methodology, which in
practice means that a departing point is the setting of targets instead of choice of
policy instruments. Policy makers thus can specify their preferences of criteria
(i.e., their objectives) and in a reversed way choice of optimal policy instruments
can be revealed, so that the design and optimal policy mix is endogenously
determined.
4.2.2 Practical solutions
Boemare et al. (2003) mention 4 potential issues that arise when attempting PI:
(a) double regulation, (b) double counting, (c) differential treatment and
equivalence of effort and (d) fungibility problem of trading commodities. Fur-
thermore, there are some points in our method that could be argued about
depending on the choice of policy instruments. A concrete example is the PI
between a carbon tax and an emissions trading scheme. In this case, evaluation
criteria of the PI can be defined and analyzed, but not all areas of PI are
comparable. For instance, the emissions trading scheme is based on a tradable
permits market that is evaluated separately (e.g., commodity traded, banking,
borrowing etc) and there is no common ground for interaction. In order to ease
the adaptability of different policy instruments, some practical solutions are
proposed (Glanchant 2001):
– Flexible policy solutions in the case of external changes (making use of market
mechanisms that allow greater degree of flexibility in abatement options)
– Use of multiple measures in an integrated form (linking different policies and
broadening the scope of legislation)
– Improved horizontal coordination between different policy branches (some PI
are an externality to differentiated policy goals)
– Decentralization and subsidiarity (decentralized policies are more apt to adjust
to exogenous changes, while policy instruments at a national level can
incorporate national economic and social characteristics)
– Policy learning and future ex-post evaluations (linking ex-ante with ex-post
studies to verify if intended policy goals are being achieved)
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5 Conclusions and recommendations
Under the Kyoto Protocol, countries have to implement various policies and mea-
sures in order to fulfill their emission reduction obligations. Parallel to this com-
mitment, other national or international policies aiming at various targets take place.
As these policies are designed and implemented in an already policy crowded
environment, interactions of these measures are taking place. Many studies so far
focused on comparison of couples of policy instruments but their interaction during
their implementation phase has gained little attendance. In this paper we address the
relatively unexplored issue of interactions of different climate policy instruments on
a national and international scale.
The basic outcome of this study is the development of a new method that can
assess interactions between different policy instruments. This new conceptual tool is
primarily qualitative and does not require empirical data. Nevertheless, the aim is to
enhance this method with modeling exercises, in order to better reflect reality and its
application by policy makers on specific policies.
Initially, we define existing types of PI according to literature and we construct
the framework, upon which these interactions take place. This step focuses on
defining ex-ante the interactions, which is fundamental in order to proceed to further
analysis.
The following footmark consists of the identification of areas, in which interaction
takes place. More specifically, through the use of an analytical table, where all levels
of policy are listed, we write down all the attributes of each policy measure and
eventually present several options of interaction. This table provides a clear insight
of the design parameters of each policy and assists the policy analyst in recognizing
potential bottlenecks and advantages of implementing several measures in the same
policy context, which often undermine ex-ante policy analysis.
The third step of our method deals with the evaluation of desired interaction
according to several parameters. In order to do that, we enumerate several criteria,
which assess in a detailed form the outcome of PI. In order to discern the evaluation
process, we include an option for a weighing factor, assigned to each criterion
individually, which can be adjusted by the policy analyst. These factors stand for the
gravity of each criterion and reflect opportunity costs that policy makers are willing
to undertake when designing the policy. Furthermore, we provide the option for
assigning degrees of uncertainty in each specific criterion, hence reducing the risks of
an analysis under incomplete information or random shifts in the policy parameters.
Finally, we would like to remind the reader that our attempt is to analyze
interactions of climate policy instruments and present all the alternative options of
designing hybrid or complex schemes, rather than proposing harmonization between
instruments within a policy mix. Through the use of this method for selected mixes
of climate and energy policy instruments, suggestions for an efficient design can
emerge.
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